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It is old sport to bemoan the depth of
Steinbrenner’s pockets, or the brazen
nature of his shopping.  The Yankees
are who they are, and always have been.
                                      ¾ Mike Lopresti,
                                           Gannett News Service
Introduction
In recent years, a few teams, notably the New York Yankees and the Boston Red
Sox of the American League (AL) and the Los Angeles Dodgers of the National League
(NL), have become conspicuous for their extravagance, spending large sums of money to
acquire arguably the best talent in baseball.  The conventional wisdom is that contenders
spend more, much more, than non-contenders do.  A case in point is the 1997 Florida
Marlins.  Their sudden success that season was attributed to management’s aggressive
decision to commit resources to free agents during the previous offseason.  When team
salaries are adjusted for the number of games won, however, is there any difference in the
average cost per win between contenders and non-contenders?   High spenders tend to
win more games than low spenders do.  Yet, both the numerator and the denominator in3
the ratio of team salaries to season wins will be larger (smaller) for high- (low-) spenders,
leaving the ratio unchanged for most teams, contenders and non-contenders alike.
The Data
Payroll data are from various Web sites.  Salary figures for 1992 through 1999 are
from www.baseballstats.net.  And, 2000 and 2001 team salary data are from
www.cnnsi.com.  All team payrolls have been adjusted for inflation.  Final team
standings are from annual editions of The Sporting News’ Baseball Guide [1].
We define “Contenders” as teams that finished first in their division, finished five
or fewer games behind the division winner, or earned the wild card berth in the divisional
playoffs.  All other teams are regarded to be “non-contenders”.  In 1994, each league was
split into three divisions that brought one wild card team from each league into the first
round of the playoffs.  In August of that same year, a players’ strike forced cancellation
of the remainder of the season.  Teams regarded as “division winners” for 1994 were
leading their divisions at the time of the strike.  “Wild card” teams for 1994 (Atlanta in
the NL and Cleveland in the AL) had the highest winning percentage among second-
place teams in each league.  As a result of realignment, the Milwaukee Brewers, an AL
team since 1970, moved from the AL Central Division to the NL Central Division in
1998
The Results
Table 1 summarizes the average cost per win (in 1992 dollars) for each league in
each of ten years (1992 through 2001).  In 1992, Los Angeles had the highest average
salary per win, $667463, and Cleveland’s average, $122676, was the lowest.  Los4
Angeles also had the highest average salary per win in the NL for the years 1998 through
2001.  In 2001, Boston had the highest average salary per win in both leagues, $1058452,
and Minnesota’s average, $226943, was the lowest.
The average differences in cost per win for contenders and non-contenders in each
league in each of two five-year periods (1992-1996 and 1997-2001) are reported in
Table 2.  Over the entire ten-year period, the difference is statistically discernible for both
leagues combined (p = .0052).  But, on closer examination, these differences are
restricted to the AL from 1992-1996 (p = .019).  Contenders and non-contenders in the
AL spent (in all but one case) marginally more than their NL counterparts, but these
differences are not statistically significant (at the .05 level).  Finally, in a comparison of
the five-year period 1992-1996 to the subsequent five-year period 1997-2001, cost per
win (in real, inflation-adjusted dollars) has increased for both contenders and non-
contenders in both leagues (at a .10 level of significance).  The one notable difference is
the higher cost per win among non-contenders in the National League.
Concluding Remarks
Despite assertions by owners that their teams are not profitable and that the game of
baseball is headed for economic calamity, all teams (contenders and non-contenders
alike) are spending marginally more per win now than they did five or ten years ago.
American League contenders outspent non-contenders on a per win basis in the period
1992-1996, but there is surprisingly little difference in cost per win between contenders
and non-contenders in the last five years.  And, any future salary cap, payroll tax, or
revenue-sharing between so-called large- and small-market clubs will likely reduce these
differences even further.5
If club costs per win in baseball are relatively constant for teams at the bottom of
the standings as well as for teams at the top, then the supply curve of output (wins)
suggested by our findings would be a horizontal line.  Equilibrium output would therefore
be demand-determined.  Clearly, large-market clubs (with the wherewithal to purchase
team quality) will produce the most output, that is, the best win records.6
Table 1.   Cost Per Win (in 1992 dollars),
by League and by Year, 1992-2001
Lowest Highest Average
Year Cost per Win Cost per Win Cost per Win
1992
AL $ 122676 $ 577242 $ 369729
(Cleveland) (Boston)
NL 184154 667463 392351
(Houston) (Los Angeles)
1993
AL 213242 560307 420622
(Cleveland) (Boston)
NL 182026 671822 354755
(Montreal) (New York Mets)
1994
AL 454785 734470 583214
(Cleveland) (Detroit)
NL 240142 727420 497564
(Montreal) (San Francisco)
1995
AL 363476 692675 482241
(Cleveland) (Toronto)
NL 174761 513196 380009
(New York Mets) (Cincinnati)
1996
AL 130790 597878 367372
(Milwaukee) (New York Yankees)
NL 175434 497612 361238
(Montreal) (Atlanta)7
Table 1.   Cost Per Win (in 1992 dollars),
by League and by Year, 1992-2001
(Continued)
1997
AL 174499 596405 416050
(Detroit) (New York Yankees)
NL 128343 571465 388277
(Pittsburgh) (St. Louis)
1998
AL 254744 782951 447506
(Detroit) (Baltimore)
NL 110141 651323 404783
(Montreal) (Los Angeles)
1999
AL 211796 814503 504323
(Minnesota) (Baltimore)
NL 185947 837810 488019
(Montreal) (Los Angeles)
2000
AL 195057 896726 560044
(Minnesota) (Baltimore)
NL 207003 834855 568165
(Florida) (Los Angeles)
2001
AL 226943 1058452 658892
(Minnesota) (Boston)
NL 370086 1003898 610588
(Florida) (Los Angeles)8
Table 2.   Cost Per Win (in 1992 dollars),
Contenders v. Non-contenders, 1992-2001
Average Cost Per Win
p-value
Years Contenders Non-contenders on difference
1992-1996
AL $495477 $419756 .019
NL 437116 380772 .13
Both leagues 468332 400059 .0052
1997-2001
AL 579510 484938 .06
NL 512474 485700 .51
Both leagues 544652 485343 .065
1992-2001
AL 538388 451997 .0046
NL 479710 435335 .12
Both leagues 509364 443364 .0016
AL NL
1992-1996
Contenders 495477 437116 .14
Non-contenders 419756 380772 .17
1997-2001
Contenders 579510 512474 .16
Non-contenders 484938 485700 .99
1992-2001
Contenders 538388 479710 .063
Non-contenders 451997 435335 .53
Average Cost Per Win
1992-1996  1997-2001
AL
Contenders 495477 579510 .057
Non-contenders 419756 484938 .10
NL
Contenders 437116 512474 .084
Non-contenders 380772 485700 .00259
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